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STABILITY AND OHANGE IN 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES: Observed, 
Recalled, and "Explained" 
Gregory B. Markus 
Using data from a panel survey of members of two generations, this study explores observed 
change in policy opinions across a 9-year span and respondents' recollections and explana- 
tions of their self-perceived attitude shifts. In general, remembrances corresponded poorly 
to opinions as originally expressed, with respondents perceiving that they were more attitu- 
dinally stable than was actually observed. When attempting to reeonstrnet their past 
political attitudes, individuals appeared to rely on simple rules of thumb such as one might 
employ to account for another's behavior. Finally, respondents readily supplied "explana- 
tions" for their self-perceived attitude history, even when those perceptions directly contra- 
dicted observed opinion change. It is argued that these results are not artifacts of survey 
measurement problems. Instead, they indicate that policy attitudes generally do not have 
strong eogalitive representations, are eminently changeable, and once they are changed, an 
individual's cognitive autobiography is revised so as to render the changes invisible. 
I t  is c o m m o n p l a c e  in bo th  survey research and  everyday  life to be  
p r o m p t e d  to th ink  abou t  one's a t t i tude  on some topic  and,  pe rhaps ,  to 
recall  the  his tory beh ind  t ha t  a t t i tude.  The re  is some evidence t ha t  unde r  
m a n y  condi t ions  " indiv iduals  c o m e  to ' know '  thei r  o w n  at t i tudes,  emo-  
tions, and  o the r  in te rna l  states pa r t i a l ly  by in fe r r ing  t h e m  f rom the obser-  
va t ion  of thei r  o w n  overt  behav io r  and /o r  the  c i rcumstances  in wh ich  this 
behav io r  occurs"  (Bern, 1972, p. 2). T h a t  is to say, the  in t rospect ive  proc-  
esses emp loyed  to cognize  one's own  a t t i tudes  m a y  not  be  very  di f ferent  
f rom those t h a t  are  used to infer  the  a t t i tudes  of others.  Nisbet t  and  Wilson 
(1977) a rgued,  for  example ,  tha t  w h e n  people  are asked to r epor t  the  
cogni t ive  processes they  themselves  used to reach  a pa r t i cu la r  j u d g m e n t ,  
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they resort to the same kinds of rules of thumb ("a priori, implicit causal 
theories") that they would use to account for another's behavior. Results 
such as these suggest that we may legitimately question whether individ- 
uals are any more privy to their own attitudes or the processes culminating 
in those attitudes than are external observers. 
The present study begins by recording the correspondence between indi- 
viduals' opinions on social and political issues of national scope as observed 
at two widely separated points in their adult lives. Using these observed 
patterns of attitude change as a point of departure, the investigation then 
considers individuals' perceptions of their own attitude developments dur- 
ing the period under study. To what extent do individuals' recollections of 
their earlier opinions diverge from those opinions as originally stated? Are 
such divergences essentially chaotic; that is, do memories of past attitudes 
become progressively fuzzed by random noise as time goes by? Or, alterna- 
tively, are there systematic, predictable tendencies in the ways that people 
reconstruct their attitudinal autobiographies-tendencies that are consis- 
tent with results obtained in experimental settings by Bem, Nisbett and 
Wilson, and others? Finally, for those individuals who believe that their 
social and political views have changed, what kinds of causal explanations 
of those ehanges do they provide? 
The investigation makes use of data from a national survey of individ- 
uals interviewed in 1973 and again in 1982. The survey respondents are 
members of two biologically linked generations, one made up of persons 
who entered adulthood during the politically turbulent era of the late 
1960s and the other consisting of their parents. 
The focus of this report is individual political cognition, and the inter- 
pretation of the empirical results that follow borrows heavily from experi- 
mental research in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
people possess coherent, predictable political opinions, or believe they pos- 
sess such opinions, is of importance to political scientists. Perhaps most 
obviously, evidence that individuals are unreliable witnesses to their own 
attitude change would undermine our confidence in surveys that ask peo- 
ple to recall or explain their political views (see Moss and Goldstein, 1979; 
Smith, 1984; Smith and Klaeser, 1983). More important, ff individuals can 
(and do) readily rewrite their cognitive autobiographies so as to support 
the belief that they have always held their present opinions, this can have 
direct macropolitieal ramifications. Orwell's 1984 is the best-known por- 
trayal of some of these ramifications (of., Greenwald, 1980), but equally 
dramatic examples can be drawn from real life political "re-education" 
schemes (see, e.g., Fagen, 1964/1970). 
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DATA BASE 
This study makes use of information gathered in the last two waves of 
what is, at least so far, a 17-year, three-wave panel survey. The panel study 
began in 1965 as an investigation of the political orientations of American 
adolescents and their parents. A national sample of high school seniors of 
the graduating class of 1965 was drawn, and 1,669 of them, along with at 
least one parent in nearly every case, were personally interviewed (Jen- 
nings and Niemi, 1974). A follow-up survey of the original respondents in 
both generations occurred in 1973 (Jennings and Niemi, 1981), and a third 
wave of interviews took place in the summer of 1982 (Jennings and 
Markus, 1984). 
Complete three-wave data exist for 898 parents (57 % of the original 
sample, or 64 % of those still living as of 1982) and for 1,135 offspring (68 % 
retention, or 70 % excluding deceased). Preliminary analysis indicates no 
obvious biases introduced by selective panel mortality for either generation 
(Jennings and Markus, 1984). Even so, it should be kept in mind that the 
samples are not entirely representative of their broader age cohorts. By 
definition, the younger respondents all possess at least a high school educa- 
tion. Similarly, the parental respondents were defined by the presence of a 
high school senior in the household in 1965. But any" difficulty the special 
character of these samples may create in generalizing to national popula- 
tions is more than compensated by the durability and longevity of the 
pane l s - and  by certain unique items that were included in the question- 
naires. 
The last point is especially relevant to this study's mission. The second 
wave (1973) interview schedule adapted a set of items that had been devel- 
oped for the 1968 Center for Political Studies' National Election Survey. 
Those items invited respondents to locate their preferred policy positions 
on a series of labeled 7-point continua referring to various issues of the day: 
domestic social welfare spending, affirmative action for minorities, mari- 
juana legalization, and so on. A similar type of scale was employed to 
determine respondents' general conceptions of their ideological points of 
view, from extreme liberal to extreme conservative. In every instance, per- 
sons who "haven't thought much about" a given topic were given an oppor- 
tunity to sidestep the question gracefully. 
This methodology was repeated in the 1982 wave for the four topies 
mentioned above plus equal rights for women and protecting the legal 
rights of persons accused of crimes, two issues also covered previously in 
the 1973 interviews. Beyond this, respondents in 1982 were requested to 
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recall what their positions on these matters were in 1973. And those who 
believed that their opinions had changed in the interim were asked if they 
had any explanation for why their views had changed. It is these data from 
the 1973 and 1982 waves that provide the basis of the present investigation. 
RESULTS 
Observed Change in Stated Attitudes, 1973 to 1982 
As a source of information on long-term attitude change, the data base 
described above is unique in terms of the sample size and the duration of 
the study. That the data capture the social and political outlooks of the 
historically significant "Vietnam era" or "baby-boom" generation makes 
them all the more noteworthy. For these reasons, before delving into the 
psychological processes underlying recall and explanation of one's attitude 
development, it is worth while first simply to document the degree of 
manifest stability and change in respondents' policy preferences as stated 
initially in 1973 and subsequently in 1982. 
The best place to begin is by noting that most respondents were willing 
to state preferred positions on the five policy items in both interviews. 
"Haven't thought much" responses among the young adults in 1973 ranged 
from 2% (women's rights) to 9% (government job guarantees); for that 
same cohort in 1982, those rates remained essentially constant. Probably 
owing to their lower overall education levels, proportionately more of their 
parents declined to locate themselves on the five issue continua in each 
wave - f rom 5% to 12%, depending on the issue. As expected from the 
experiences of other survey studies, relatively more respondents preferred 
to bypass the ideological placement question. On both occasions 14 % of 
the younger respondents opted out of that item, while 23 % and 25 % of 
their parents did so in 1973 and 1982, respectively. 
Aggregate Attitude Distributions 
As Table i shows, in 1973 the baby-boom cohort was consistently more 
liberal than were their parents as a group on all five policy items and on 
overall ideological self-concept. With the exception of the women's role 
issue, there was a slight conservative drift for the parents from 1973 to 1982 
and a more noticeable one for the offspring. Whether those shifts were age- 
related or else due to the prevailing sociopolitical context of the period is 
the subject of another study, but either way the net result was a consider- 
able narrowing of the generation gap. ~ In 1982 the offspring remained 
somewhat more liberal than their parents on protecting the rights of the 
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TABLE 1. Aggregate Profiles of Issue Positions as Stated in 1973 and 1982 
25 
A. Government guaranteed jobs and living standard versus let people get ahead on 
their own. 
Government Ahead 
Guarantee on Own 
Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 10% 8 27 17 37 99% (797) 
Parents, 1982 9% 8 28 22 34 101% (781) 
Offspring, 1973 15 % 14 25 20 26 100 % (1,032) 
Offspring, 1982 8 % 10 20 28 35 101% (1,065) 




Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 22% 8 21 13 36 100% (791) 
Parents, 1982 12% 7 18 19 45 101% (791) 
Offspring, 1973 39% 14 19 13 15 99% (1,071) 
Offspring, 1982 15% 9 22 23 31 100% (1,090) 




Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 17% 7 33 11 32 100% (833) 
Parents, 1982 11% 9 29 17 33 99% (822) 
Offspring, 1973 25% 17 24 16 18 100% (1,087) 
Offspring, 1982 12% 13 25 21 29 100% (1,094) 
D. Legalize marijuana use versus set penalties higher. 
Legalize Higher 
Use Penalties 
Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 9 % 4 14 7 66 
Parents, 1982 10 % 2 11 7 69 
Offspring, 1973 31% 10 16 6 36 






TABLE 1. (Continued) 
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E. Women and men should have equal roles versus women's place is in the home. 
Equal In the 
Roles Home 
Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 29% 7 28 11 26 100% (849) 
Parents, 1982 43% 7 22 9 18 99% (846) 
Offspring, 1973 49% 12 19 8 13 101% (1,115) 
Offspring, 1982 68% 9 12 4 6 99% (1,118) 
E Liberal political views versus conservative political views. 
Liberal Conservative 
Respondents (1-2) 3 4 5 (6-7) Total 
Parents, 1973 10% 7 38 25 20 100% (692) 
Parents, 1982 9 % 6 38 22 25 100 % (668) 
Offspring, 1973 17% 23 32 17 11 100% (978) 
Offspring, 1982 12 % 16 29 25 18 100 % (977) 
Note. Percentages are based on individuals interviewed in both waves. Percentages may not 
sum to 100 due to rounding. 
accused, marijuana legalization, and overall ideological posture, but on 
two other issues, government job guarantees and aid to minorities, the 
1982 generational contrasts were negligible. Contrary to the general con- 
servative trend, both generations were markedly more positive toward 
equality in gender roles in 1982 than they" were 9 years earlier; because 
both age groups moved leftward in the aggregate by roughly equal 
amounts on this issue, the offspring remained more liberal than their 
parents. 
Individual Level Stability 
The generally placid aggregate profiles of parents" opinions are no guar- 
antee of attitude stability at the individual level. Indeed, Converse's (1964, 
1970) original work on "nonattitudes" was spurred by the observation that  
opinion turnover tables from panel surveys often displayed roughly con- 
stant marginals coexisting with heavy, but countervailing, circulation of 
respondents among opinion categories. Consequently, it is important to 
consider individual-level as well as net change. 
As shown in Table 2, our respondents exhibited a fair amount of mani- 
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TABLE 2. Correspondence between Individuals' Issue Positions as Stated in 1973 
and 1982 
Issue Correlation ~ 
Same Difference of 
Position 3 + Categories 
(percentage) (percentage) 
Parents 
Guaranteed jobs .41 32 16 
Rights of accused .29 26 28 
Aid to minorities .37 29 21 
Legalize marijuana .43 50 22 
Women's roles .44 33 30 
Ideology .57 48 4 
Offspring 
Guaranteed jobs .35 27 18 
Rights of accused .32 22 29 
Aid to minorities .41 27 20 
Legalize marijuana .61 36 22 
Women's roles .44 37 22 
Ideology .45 35 9 
Entries are Pearson product-moment correlations. 
lest instability in individual attitudes from one wave of interviewing to the 
next. Although the baby-boomers experienced a relatively larger net atti- 
tude shift, they were not appreciably more unstable at the individual level 
than were their parents from 1973 to 1982. That is, parents were only 
slightly more likely than their offspring to express identical opinions in 
both surveys, and across all six items the two cohorts were about equal in 
terms of the proportions of individuals who shifted stated positions by 
three or more points from one wave to the next. 
Another perspective on individual change is offered by the continuity 
correlations in Table 2. Those coefficients measure relative stability, i.e., 
the extent to which individuals maintained the same relative positions in 
their cohort's distribution of policy preferences apart from any uniform 
shifts of opinion that may have occurred. In terms of relative stability, the 
two cohorts were once again generally comparable, a result that coincides 
with that obtained with respect to other political and nonpolitical orienta- 
tions of these panel members (Jennings and Markus, 1984). 
Before leaving Table 2, there is one other observation worth making. A 
previous study using materials from the 1956-58-60 and 1972-74-76 Na- 
tional Election Study panel surveys uncovered a rough hierarchy in the 
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temporal stability of individual attitudes toward various issue domains 
(Converse and Markus, 1979). In general, opinions on issues associated 
with personal moral values tended to be the most stable (as indexed by 
autocorrelation values) followed by domestic issues having concrete, un- 
complicated referents, e.g., government guaranteed jobs or federal en- 
forcement of school integration. Bringing up the rear in terms of relative 
stability were attitudes toward matters remote from everyday experience or 
that dealt with abstract political themes, such as foreign policy or whether 
the federal government has become too powerful. The patterns of correla- 
tions in Table 2 are entirely in keeping with the NES results: of the five 
issue areas covered in the present surveys, attitudes toward marijuana 
legalization and equality of gender roles were the most stable within each 
cohort, responses to the items concerning domestic jobs programs and 
government aid to minority groups came next, and opinions regarding 
legal guarantees of the rights of defendants displayed the lowest correla- 
tions. 
As occurred in the Converse-Markus NES analysis, the relative stability 
of ideological self-concept rivaled that of opinions on morally charged 
issues. The explanation for this result is contained in the special circum- 
stances surrounding responses to the ideology item. First, a large chunk of 
the total population was eliminated entirely from the computation of sta- 
bility measures by the "'no opinion" filter. Among the parents, fully 35 % 
failed to locate themselves on a liberal-conservative continuum in at least 
one wave of interviews; and even among their more highly educated off- 
spring, 23 % passed the item by in either 1973 or 1982. Second, of those 
persons who did respond, as many as one in five chose to play it safe by 
selecting each time the center location (which is also virtually the mean of 
the distribution), thereby neither adding to nor detracting from correlation 
values. It is, therefore, technically correct that ideological self-concept was 
fairly enduring, but the fine print states that this conclusion applies only to 
a decidedly select population. 
Recollections of Political Attitudes 
The 1982 interviews elicited not only respondents' current political ori- 
entations but also their recollections of what their orientations had been 9 
years earlier. There is good reason to expect that those recollections would 
not be particularly accurate, in the sense of corresponding to opinions as 
recorded in 1973. In the lingo of cognitive psychology, policy preferences 
ordinarily lack clear internal representations: they are only glaneingly 
related to one's sense of self identity ("self-schema") and are typically not 
linked to readily available memories of salient events or experiences (cf., 
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TABLE 3. Correspondence between 1973 Stated Issue Positions and Those Posi- 
tions as Recalled in 1982 
Issue Correlation ° 
No Difference of 
Difference 3 + Categories 
(percentage) (percentage) 
Parents 
Guaranteed jobs .40 30 19 
Rights of accused .29 27 29 
Aid to minorities .34 27 22 
Legalize marijuana .31 47 20 
Women's roles .39 30 30 
Ideology .56 43 4 
Offspring 
Guaranteed jobs .33 25 20 
Rights of accused .33 24 25 
Aid to minorities .38 24 21 
Legalize marijuana .60 35 20 
Women's roles .40 33 24 
Ideology .56 36 6 
Entries are Pearson product-moment correlations. 
Markus and Zajonc, 1985; Fiske and Taylor, 1984). For most people, then, 
to recall a policy opinion is a mental exercise that "may be impossible and 
undoubtedly is difficult" (Smith, 1984, p. 645). Indeed, if 30 years of 
survey research has determined anything, it is that for most people most of 
the time political policy matters are remote from daily concerns, and it is 
quite enough for citizens to provide interviewers with some sense of what 
their current  issue attitudes are, let alone recall what their dispositions 
might have been many years ago (see, e.g., Kinder and Sears, 1985). 
~¢Vhether or not it is entirely fair to ask respondents to dredge up political 
predispositions from 9 years previous, they were apparently willing to try: 
Among those persons who provided a current self-placement in 1982, only 
2 % to 6 % (depending on the topic) declined the added invitation to esti- 
mate where they stood on the various policy and ideological continua in 
1973. Their efforts were only modestly successful, however, as evidenced by 
Table 3. On average, only about one-third of respondents' 1982 recollec- 
tions coincided with their 1973 self-placements; and depending on the 
cohort and the topic, the proportion of recollections that diverged from 
originally stated positions by 3 or more points on a 7-point continuum was 
often as large as or even larger than the proportion that matched. 
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Beyond the verification of suspicions of modest reeollective reliability lay 
some questions with less foregone answers. To reiterate the introductory 
remarks, one such question concerns whether divergences between re- 
called and originally stated attitudes consist of little more than random 
noise or whether instead there are systematic heuristics that individuals 
employ when reconstructing their cognitive autobiographies. There is rea- 
son to believe that the latter is true. 
A standard manipulation employed is experimental studies of attitude 
change involves asking subjects to engage in some particular counterattitu- 
dinal behavior and then observing the extent to which their attitudes sub- 
sequently change in the hypothesized direction. In one such experiment 
(involving counterattitudinal essay writing), Bern and McConnell (1970) 
examined not only whether attitude change occurred but also whether 
subjects were aware  that their attitudes had changed. As part of the post- 
manipulation measurement, the experimenters asked subjects what their 
attitudes had been one week earlier, prior to the experimental treatment. 
Control subjects who wrote no essays did not change attitudinally and 
were fairly accurate in reporting as much. In contrast, though the post- 
manipulation attitudes of experimental subjects differed substantially and 
systematically from their attitudes as stated prior to the experiment, those 
subjects also reported that their previous attitudes were the same as their 
current ones. As Bern and McConnell put it, "actual premanipulation 
attitudes are not salient features of postmanipulation phenomenology and 
are recalled as identical to postmanipulation attitudes" (p. 28). 
A similar result was obtained by Goethals and Reckman (1973), even 
though the participants in their study were explicitly reminded that the 
experimenters had retained participants' premanipulation opinion state- 
ments and would be checking the accuracy of their recall. Again, the 
suggestion is that individuals may undergo attitude change without being 
aware that such a process has occurred. To account for results such as these, 
Bem developed a "self-perception theory," the basic tenet of which is that 
individuals come to know their internal attitude states by observing their 
own external behavior. "To the extent that information from internal cues 
is weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is functionally in 
the same position as an outside observer of his behavior" (Bern and McCon- 
nell, 1970, p. 23). 
When respondents in the panel survey were asked in 1982 to recall their 
attitudes of nine years ago, clearly the most salient piece of externally 
available information that they possessed was their current attitudes as 
they had just described them to the interviewer. Consequently, we should 
expect that, as in the laboratory studies, panel respondents' recollections of 
their prior attitudes should be strongly biased toward their current ones. 2 
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TABLE 4. Respondents' Recalled Change in Their Issue Positions from 1973 to 
1982 
Issue Correlation ~ 
Recall No Recall Change of 
Change 3 + Categories 
(percentage) (percentage) 
Parents 
Guaranteed jobs .83 78 4 
Rights of accused .78 70 8 
Aid to minorities .80 75 5 
Legalize marijuana .69 73 10 
Women's roles .80 69 10 
Ideotog3 ~ .80 70 2 
Offspring 
Guaranteed jobs .47 46 14 
Rights of accused .60 50 15 
Aid to minorities .60 46 13 
Legalize marijuana ,69 56 16 
Women's roles .54 50 23 
Ideology .45 38 10 
Entries are Pearson product-moment correlations between 1982 stated issue position and 1982 
recollection of 1973 issue position. 
Table 4 provides resounding support for this expectation. In every in- 
stance, remembrances of past attitudes were more highly correlated with 
current  self-placements than they were with the 1973 self-placements that 
the respondents were attempting to recall (compare the column of correla- 
tions in Table 4 with the one in Table 3). The percentage columns in Table 
4 yield the same message as the correlations: substantially more respon- 
dents believed that their 1973 attitudes were identical to their current ones 
than could be corroborated by actually comparing their self-placements 
from 1973 with those from 1982 (contrast Table 4 with Table 2). 
It could be argued that this result is not necessarily evidence of "cogni- 
tive heuristics" but rather of a desire on the part of respondents to appear 
cognitively consistent to the interviewers. That is, people might "know" 
that their attitudes have changed but, nevertheless, be reluctant to admit it 
for fear of appearing fickle or capricious in their political thinking. Per- 
haps, but this thesis cannot account for other features of the data that will 
be presented momentarily, nor does it explain why the tendency to reealt 
past attitudes as being identical to current ones is so much stronger among 
the parents than among their offspring. Across the six self-placement items, 
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an average of 73 % of the older respondents maintained that their 1973 
positions were no different from their more current ones. In contrast, only 
48 % of the offspring, on average, held that view (see Table 4). And this was 
despite the fact that younger respondents were not observably any less 
stable in their attitudes than were their elders, as was demonstrated in 
Table 2. How can this difference between the two age groups be explained? 
One plausible explanation may be derived from Nisbett and Wilson's 
(1977) suggestion that apart from referencing current attitude states to 
infer past ones, individuals and external observers alike might employ 
certain "implicit causal theories" when attempting to reconstruct cognitive 
processes. These implicit causal theories may have any of several origins. 
For example, individuals growing up in a specific cultural or subcultural 
context may learn that certain stimuli "psychologically imply" a particular 
response, to use Abelson's (1968) phrase. With reference to the present case, 
respondents may have been using a causal heuristic that "younger people 
are less set in their ways than older people are." 
Some support for this explanation is provided by responses to a question 
in the 1982 interview schedule. The question wording was: "Some people 
say that their basic political views change a lot as they get older. Others 
find that their basic political ideas don't change much. Thinking back over 
the past ten years or so, would you say that your basic political ideas have 
changed a great deal, somewhat, or hardly at all?" While 61% of the 
parental respondents chose the last option, only 36% of the offspring did. 
And, to reiterate, this was despite the fact that younger interviewees were 
not demonstrably less stable in their political attitudes than were their 
parents. The interpretation made here is that the reason younger respon- 
dents were less likely than their elders to recall their past policy and ideo- 
logical positions as being identical to their current ones is because younger 
respondents believed they" had just experienced a life stage of changing 
basic political ~-iews. 
Taking the "implicit causal theories" idea one step further, Smith (1984) 
suggested that individuals may attempt to divine their past attitudes "from 
external clues such as known or perceived changes in national or commu- 
nity attitudes" (pp. 645-646). Applying this idea to the present case, our 
respondents may have relied on causal heuristics that correspond roughly 
to the aggregate profiles displayed previously in Table 1. That is, they may 
have an intuitive sense that, generally, people have gotten more conserva- 
tive on issues such as taw and order or special treatment for minorities or 
that attitudes toward women's rights have gotten more liberal. The larger 
the observable population shift in an attitude has been, the more likely it 
is that such a heuristic would be available to individuals and, in turn, 
employed by them. If so, the panel data should show respondents' percep- 
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TABLE 5. Relationships between Observed and Recalled Attitude Change on the 
Rights of Accused and Women's Roles Issues 
A. Parents 
Issue 
Direction of Direction of Recalled Change 
Observed Change Liberal None Conservative Total 
a. Rights of Accused 
b. Women's Roles 
3+ Liberal 15% 80 5 100% (61) 
1 - 2  Liberal 7% 70 23 100% (120) 
None 6% 80 14 100% (172) 
1 - 2 Conservative 8 % 62 31 100 % (182) 
3+ Conservative 3% 67 30 100% (118) 
Total 7 % 71 22 1O0 % (653) 
3+ Liberal 33% 65 2 100% (160) 
1 - 2  Liberal 31% 66 3 100% (172) 
None 22 % 73 5 100 % (241) 
1 - 2 Conservative 20 % 72 8 100 % (100) 
3 + Conservative 18% 73 9 100% (56) 
Total 26% 70 5 101% (729) 
B. Offspring 
Issue 
Direction of Direction of Recalled Change 
Observed Change Liberal None Conservative Total 
a. Rights of Accused 
b, Women's Roles 
3+ Liberal 33% 53 14 100% (36) 
1 - 2 Liberal 17 % 59 24 100 % (131) 
None 13% 62 25 100% (189) 
1 - 2 Conservative 9 % 43 47 99 % (289) 
3 + Conservative 5 % 42 53 100 % (209) 
Total 11% 50 39 100 % (854) 
3 + Liberal 57% 43 1 101% (159) 
1 - 2 Liberal 53 % 44 3 100 % (271) 
None 34 % 62 5 101% (340) 
1 - 2  Conservative 40% 39 22 101% (88) 
3 + Conservative 23% 51 26 100% (43) 
Total 44% 50 6 100% (901) 
t ions of the i r  own  a t t i tude  shifts to be skewed in  the d i rec t ion of prevai l ing  
p o p u l a t i o n  t rends  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of whether ,  for each ind iv idua l ,  the  ob- 
served a t t i tude  change  ac tua l ly  cor responded to the na t i ona l  t rend.  
Precisely tha t  pa t t e rn  is found ,  as exemplif ied in Table 5. T h a t  t ab le  
displays the  relat ionships  be tween  observed a nd  self-perceived a t t i tude  
change  in  the form of s imple  con t ingency  tables.  Two issues w i th  fair ly  
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TABLE 6. Relationships between Observed and Recalled Changes in Issue Posi- 
tions 
Issue for Which Observed Change 
There Is a Recalled Constant Coefficient 
Change in Attitude (a) (b) R 2 I'1 
Parents 
Guaranteed jobs .02 (.04) .09 (.02) .03 632 
Rights of accused .28 (.05) .11 (.02) .04 653 
Aid to minorities .05 (.04) .11 (.02) .05 702 
Legalize marijuana - .25 (.05) .20 (.03) .08 657 
Women's roles - .41 (.05) .11 (.02) .03 729 
Ideology .18 (.04) .18 (.03) .06 520 
Offspring 
Guaranteed jobs .20 (.06) .31 (.03) .11 790 
Rights of accused .30 (.06) .26 (.02) .12 854 
Aid to minorities .30 (.05) .26 (.03) .09 866 
Legalize marijuana - ,23 (.05) .35 (.03) .17 838 
Women's roles - .76 (.06) .28 (.03) .09 901 
Ideology ,16 (.05) .61 (.03) .32 733 
Note. Entries are unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
clear patterns (one a conservative bias and the other a liberal one) were 
selected: the rights of criminally accused and equal gender roles. The table 
shows that both parents and offspring with no observable change in atti- 
tudes toward defendents' rights were more likely to recall a conservative 
shift in their attitudes (i.e., one consistent with the population trend) than 
to recall a liberal shift. Indeed, even those respondents having an observed 
shift of one to two positions in the liberal direction were more likely to 
remember their opinion change as being conservative rather than liberal. 
This sort of pattern is even clearer (but in the opposite direction) with 
respect to self-placement on the gender roles continuum. In that instance, 
even those parental respondents whose observed attitude change was three 
or more steps in a conservative direction between 1973 and 1982 were more 
likely to perceive themselves as having changed in a liberal direction (the 
population trend) than in a rightward one. 
A demonstration of comparable patterns with respect to other atti tude 
domains, along with a summarization of the concomitant recall bias in the 
direction of current stated attitude, is accomplished in Table 6. That  table 
is a bit more complicated than the others and deserves a word of explana- 
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tion, It displays the results of a series of regressions of self-perceived atti- 
tude change on externally observed attitude change. The dependent vari- 
able, self-perceived attitude change, is operationalized as the difference 
between a respondent's 1982 self-placement on a particular opinion scale 
and the respondent's 1982 recollection of his or her 1973 opinion scale 
position. The independent variable, observed attitude change, is simply 
the difference between a respondent's self-placements as reported in 1982 
and 1973. The regression equation is the following: 
($8~ - R73)i = a + b (Ss2 - $7.3)~ + u~ (1) 
As can be seen from inspection of Equation 1, the b coefficient measures 
the overall extent to which each one point difference between a respon- 
dent's positions on an issue as stated in 1973 and 1982 is translated into an 
attitude shift as recalled by that respondent in 1982, Values of b between 
zero and one would indicate that respondents on the whole believed that 
their attitudes had ehanged less than may be observed in their stated issue 
positions of 1973 and 1982, Values greater than unity would imply that 
individuals tended to have an exaggerated sense of how much they changed 
issue positions from 1973 to 1982. The constant term, a, indicates the 
magnitude of any net directional bias in respondents' remembrances of 
their attitude evolution over the study period. A positive value denotes a 
conservative bias, ceteris paribus; that is, on average individuals with no 
observed difference in stated opinions from 1973 to 1982 recalled that they 
had become more conservative since 1973 by an amount of a units. A 
negative a value has a similar interpretation but in the liberal direction. 
The b coefficients in Table 6 show that, for the parental cohort, recalled 
attitude change was almost independent of observed attitude change: on 
average, an observed shift in self-placement of one position on a 7-position 
scale translated into a one-tenth to two-tenths of a position self-perceived 
shift for that cohort. This means that to the extent parents' recollections of 
their 1973 attitudes corresponded at all to those attitudes as stated origi- 
nally, it was because of whatever resemblance existed between their cur- 
rent dispositions and their prior ones. For the younger cohort, the relation- 
ships between self-perceived and observed attitude shifts were a bit greater, 
but even so, a one point observable change led to only about a one-third 
point recalled change with respect to the five policy domains. Only on 
ideological self-concept for the younger respondents was the correspon- 
dence between observed and self-perceived change impressive. 
The fact that this correspondence occurred for ideological orientation 
rather than for policy preferences is not entirely surprising. As a number of 
recent studies have pointed out, the notion of an individual's ideological 
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self-concept is closely related to the cognitive psychologists' concept of a 
political sell-schema (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Lau, 1984; Hamill and 
Lodge, 1984). Self-schemata can be thought of as "generalizations or theo- 
ries about the self in particular domains, derived from past experience, 
that are used to guide the processing of social information relevant to these 
domains" (Markus and Zajonc, 1985). H. Markus and her colleagues have 
investigated a variety of cognitive consequences associated with self-sche- 
mata and have concluded that "schematics," i.e., persons possessing a 
schema in a particular domain, have better recognition memory and recall 
for information relevant to that domain than do "aschematies" (Markus 
and Sentis, 1982; Markus et al., 1982). It makes sense, then, that the 
evolution of one's ideological self-concept would be more likely to be re- 
called reliably than would one's predispositions on various policy matters. 
What is more puzzling is the substantial contrast between younger citi- 
zens and their parents in terms of the reliability of self-perceptions of past 
ideological orientations. Additional analysis shows that part of the differ- 
ence is due to the younger cohort's higher overall level of education, a 
factor that accounts for the consistently larger b coefficients for that cohort 
as compared with comparable values obtained for the parent sample. Al- 
though higher education is not a guarantee of increased political sophisti- 
cation (and a consequently stronger ideological self-schema), the two are 
clearly related. Even so, with education level held constant the correspon- 
dence between observed and recalled change in ideological self-concept 
remained noticeably greater among the offspring as compared with their 
elders. Controlling for other plausible variables, e.g., amount of stated 
interest in politics or degree of attendance to political information in the 
media, also failed to erase the between-cohort difference. Although it must 
be made tentatively at this time, the conclusion is that we are observing a 
generational distinction in the extent to which ideologically tinged infor- 
mation is relevant to and reflected in political self-schemata. 
These results prompted one other attempt to assess the hypothesis that 
schematics are more likely than asehematics to recall schema-relevant in- 
formation. One section of the 1982 interview schedule elicited respondents' 
evaluations of various social and political groups, including the women's 
liberation movement, by use of a 0-100 degree "feeling thermometer" 
scale. Using these ratings to classify respondents, it was found that persons 
who felt "very warm or favorable" (100-degree rating) toward the women's 
liberation movement - and who presumably possessed unambiguous "fem- 
inist" schemata-were  substantially more accurate in recalling their 1973 
positions on the gender roles item than were respondents who stated that 
they had "no feeling at all" (50 degrees) or else did not know anything 
concerning the women's liberation movement. For the younger cohort, 
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56 % of the feminist schematics recalled their 1973 positions accurately as 
compared with only 33% of the aschematies (X~= 10.13, p <.01). Among 
the parents, the corresponding values were 44 % for schematics versus 28 % 
for aschematics (x~= 5.87, p = .05). 
Results from another study based on these panel data (Jennings, 1984) 
also support the contention that individuals for whom politics is relevant to 
their self-schemata are more likely to recall accurately their policy opinions 
than are persons who are politically aschematie. Focusing exclusively on 
the baby-boom cohort, Jennings found that respondents who had reported 
participating in political protests while in college had "a more accurate 
mental picture of their political transitions than did the non-protesters" 
(p. 46). 
Returning to Table 6, recall that the columns of a values in that table 
speak to the hypothesis that self-perceptions of one's attitude shifts may be 
skewed in the direction of population trends. As can be seen in Table 6, the 
magnitudes and signs of estimated a values are consistent with this idea. 
With one exeeption, a eoeffieients for issues on which the population trend 
was in a conservative direction have positive signs, indicating a conserva- 
tive bias in recall, while the a values for the gender role item (the only one 
having a liberal trend) are negative and fairly large. 
"Explaining" Self-Perceived Attitude Change 
We have seen that, with some noted exceptions, individuals' remem- 
brances of their changing political opinions do not comport well with 
observed changes in those opinions. This fact notwithstanding, some ex- 
perimental results suggest that individuals are quite talented at construct- 
ing plausible-sounding-but quite possibly erroneous- "explanations" for 
their self-perceived attitude evolution. Consider, for example, Wixon and 
Laird's (1976) comments about the subjects in their experiments in which 
attitude change was induced by having participants give a counterattitu- 
dinal speech: 
For any of the items which had any suggestion of political content, the common 
explanation for these subjects (run during the fall of 1974) was that "Watergate 
had changed my mind about that." Subjects are characteristically so persuasive 
when offering these explanations that we would be seriously tempted to believe 
them except that no corresponding changes occur in control groups. These ob- 
servations suggest that these subjects were, in effect, revising their own histories 
to make sense of the change in their attitudes. The speed, magnitude, and 
certainty of these revisions were striking. (p. 383) 
As in the Wixon-Laird research, respondents in our panel study who 
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thought that their policy opinions had changed from 1973 to 1982 were 
invited to provide their own reasoning about why the change occurred. 
Unlike the experiment, we cannot know the true source of respondents" 
attitude changes. We can, however, determine the extent to which respon- 
dents were willing to supply explanations for their self-perce:ved opinion 
shifts, even when those self-perceptions were in disaccord with their ob- 
served attitude history. In addition, we may explore the content of these 
autobiographical explanations to determine what regularities they may 
display. 
The first topic can be dealt with quickly. Regardless of whether self- 
perceived and observed attitude change concurred, nearly all respondents 
who thought that their opinions on some policy matter had changed also 
had ideas about why the change had occurred. Even in instances where the 
recalled opinion shift ran directly counter to the observed one, no more 
than 5 % to 10 % of the respondents failed to supply a supporting story for 
their recollections. 3 
Respondents were almost certainly not deliberately trying to deceive the 
interviewers. Rather, the conclusion drawn here is that respondents were 
simply searching their memories for some l~istorical or autobiographical 
circumstance that could plausibly account for the self-perceived opinion 
change -much  as an external observer possessing the same information 
would. 
Not only was the ability to provide "explanations" for self-perceived 
attitude shifts independent of the correspondence between perceived and 
observed shifts, so was the content of those explanations. Respondents' 
comments regarding their recalled attitude evolutions were categorized 
according to whether they were references to specific events in one's own 
life, mentions of political or societal events, general references to "aging,' 
miscellaneous issue-specific remarks, and so on. The distributions of com- 
ments across a 6-category coding scheme were virtually the same regardless 
of whether or not perceived and observed opinion change coincided. 
Table 7 summarizes the kinds of explanations provided by respondents 
for their self-perceived attitude shifts in the various issue areas. For both 
cohorts, there was a clear tendency for comments to revolve around refer- 
ences to various political or social events, circumstances, or situations that 
occurred between 1973 and 1982. 
For example, one parent accounted for her self-perceived rightward drift 
on federal jobs programs this way: 
The economy was different [in 1973]. Unemployment was low, and when the 
economy is good you feel that the government should give everyone help. 
A younger male observed that he had probably become more conservative 
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Specific Broad Political/ Misc. Content 
Life Personal Social Issue Don't 
Aging Events Outlook Events Specific Know Total 
(%)° (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) n 
Parents 
Guaranteed jobs 9 12 9 72 6 21 186 
Rights of accused 3 7 4 91 9 15 234 
Aid to minorities 6 7 7 89 16 19 195 
Legalize marijuana 0 8 3 88 24 8 226 
Women's roles 4 23 3 77 16 7 244 
Ideology 17 8 27 51 9 22 192 
Offspring 
Guaranteed jobs 7 28 20 57 9 15 510 
Bights of accused 3 20 10 72 17 10 475 
Aid to minorities 2 18 13 72 12 14 517 
Legalize marijuana 3 20 6 70 18 11 422 
Women's roles 3 40 12 54 11 11 481 
Ideology 14 19 44 27 10 20 523 
,~Entries sum to more than 100% since interviewers recorded up to two responses per issue area. 
with respect to federal programs for minority groups for the following 
reason: 
Government programs to do this kind of thing have been terrible failures. Money 
ends up lining the pockets of politicians. 
This emphasis on situational factors is consistent with the Jones and Nis- 
bett (1971) hypothesis that observers of events are prone to attribute re- 
sponsibility for outcomes to persons rather than to situations, whereas 
actors in events will tend to do just the reverse. That is because, for an 
observer, "the a c t o r . . ,  is dynamic and interesting, while situations more 
commonly are static and pallid . . . .  The actor and his actions, in other 
words, are 'figural' against the 'ground' of the situation" (pp. 1222-1223). 
Actors themselves, in contrast, cannot easily watch themselves ac t - t he i r  
dispositions are not "figural'" to them. Consequently, actors (our respon- 
dents with respect to their own attitudes and behaviors) tend to refer to 
situational factors in their attributions of cause. 
Despite the overall emphasis on situational factors, respondents did 
mention other things. In particular, Table 7 shows that baby-boomers were 
noticeably more likely than their parents to be introspective in their com- 
ments, referring to their own aging, to specific events or experiences in 
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their own lives, or to changes in their own broad personal outlooks. For 
instance, one younger woman thought that she had come to be a strong 
supporter of equal gender roles because of her experiences in the work 
force: 
Maybe because I've worked, and I know what it's like to do a man's job and not 
get paid for it. 
Finally, and in keeping with aforementioned generational distinctions in 
the salience of ideological concepts to self-schema, Table 7 indicates that 
younger respondents were substantially more likely than their elders to see 
any self-perceived ideological evolution over the 9-year period as being one 
aspect of a larger process of development in their broad personal outlooks, 
that is, as part of acquiring a richer, more mature perspective on life. For 
instance, a 34-year-old woman from Salt Lake City elaborated her belief 
that she had become less conservative over the past 9 years: 
I've grown a lot. I know" more now. By "conservative" I mean I was immature, 
shy, and didn't know much about life. Then I learned I had to voice my opinion 
and stand up for my rights or else nobody would care. 
A similar kind of explanation, but a self-perceived ideological evolution in 
the opposite direction, was provided by a 35-year-old Nebraskan: 
I was not well-informed philosophically or socially at that time. I tended to be a 
little unforgiving in 1973. Now I believe I can be more tolerant due to my better 
understanding of things. 
CONCLUSIONS 
An analysis of the policy preferences of the baby-boom generation and 
its parents revealed a marked conservative shift between 1973 and 1982 for 
the former group and a weaker conservative trend for the la t ter-weaker  
primarily because the parents were, on the whole, fairly conservative to 
begin with. The one exception to this pattern concerned attitudes toward 
the roles of women in society, for which both cohorts exhibited a distinct 
liberalization of opinion. Overall, the younger cohort remained more lib- 
eral on all issues than that of their parents, but the generation gap had 
narrowed considerably by 1982. With respect to the individual-level atti- 
tude movements that lay beneath the aggregate trends, we found only 
modest degrees of observed attitude stability, particularly for opinions in 
domains that were abstract and not very salient to everyday experience. 
The bulk of the study focused on individuals' recollections of their past 
attitudes. Those recollections tended to correspond poorly to attitudes as 
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originally expressed, and respondents generally perceived that they were 
more stable attitudinally than was indicated observationally. When at- 
tempting to reconstruct their past political orientations, respondents ap- 
peared to rely on the kinds of simple "rules of thumb" that one would use 
to account for another's behavior. One such rule appeared to be that young 
adulthood is a time of greater attitude change than is middle or old age. 
Another rule involved inferring onds own attitude evolution from knowl- 
edge about population trends. Finally, individuals were capable of supply- 
ing "explanations" of their self-perceived opinion shifts even when those 
pereeptions were direetly eontrary to their observed opinion changes. Gen- 
erally, those explanations focused on well-known political, societal, or his- 
torieal events, a pattern eonsistent with some hypotheses arising from ex- 
perimental research. Taken together, these results indicate that policy 
orientations generally do not have strong internal eognitive representa- 
tions, are eminently ehangeable, and that, once those orientations are 
changed, an individual's cognitive autobiography is rewritten so as to ren- 
der the changes invisible. 
Of course, not all individuals are equally unaware of their attitude 
histories. There was evidence that members of the Vietnam-era cohort 
who possessed ideological self-schemata tended to recall accurately any 
changes in those sehemata and interpreted such change as part of a larger 
process of development in their broad personal outlooks. Similarly, indi- 
viduals who felt very favorably toward the women's liberation movement, 
and for whom feminist issues were likely to be sehema-relevant, were 
substantially more reliable in recollecting their past attitudes on the issue 
of equal gender roles than were persons who were ostensibly asehematie 
with respeet to such matters. So, too, were former political protesters more 
likely than nonprotesters to recall their past political attitudes reliably. 
These findings suggest that the reliability of reeall of past attitude states 
varies with the degree to whieh cues about those past states are cognitively 
available to the individual. For those persons whose policy preferences are 
integral to their views of themselves, cues about prior policy attitudes will 
be eognitively available and recall of sueh attitudes will be reliable. For 
most people, though, vivid, informative clues to one's past policy opinions 
probably do not come readily to mind, and recollections of those opinions 
will be guided by the kinds of "rules of thumb" described above. 
Finally, there is the matter of measurement error in survey responses. 
Aehen (1975), Pierce and Rose (1974), Dalton (1980), and others have 
argued that the typically weak correlations of attitudes as measured across 
waves of panel surveys, and the low coherence of individual survey re- 
sponses in general, are due largely to shorteomings in measurement proce- 
dures rather than to "nonattitudes." Measurement error surely exists in the 
data on which the present study was based. Can it be that the patterns 
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found herein can be dismissed as mere  artifacts of such error? 
Measurement  noise not only can but  p robably  does play a role in ac- 
counting for some of the results displayed here. For example, some of the 
discrepancy between observed attitudes in 1973 and 1982 is undoubtedly  
due to measurement  imprecision, as is pa r t  of the slippage between re- 
called and originally stated self-placements. I t  is doubtful ,  however, tha t  
the findings reported here are entirely artifactual.  
Recall, for example, that  older respondents'  remembrances  of their  1973 
issue positions were virtually independent of those positions as originally 
registered in the 1973 surveys, ceteris paribus. But the same measurement  
techniques produced autocorrelations of contemporary  political attitudes 
from 1973 to 1982 that  were regularly in the .4 to .6 range. Consequently 
measurement  error alone cannot  account for the prevailing political amne- 
sia. In addition, the evidence for the existence of implicit  causal heuristics, 
the distinctions between younger and older cohorts '  recollections and ra- 
tionalizations of at t i tude change, or differences in the recollective reliabil- 
ity of politically schematic versus aschematic persons probably  cannot  be 
explained parsimoniously by reference solely to measurement  problems. 
These kinds of effects, uncovered originally in the laboratory and con- 
f i rmed and elaborated here, are, I conclude, both  real and robust. 
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NOTES 
1. See Markus and Jennings (1985) for further discussion of this topic. 
2. There is an alternative theory, compatible with the Bemian one, that also predicts that 
respondents' reports of their past scale locations would be biased toward their current ones. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have demonstrated convincingly that an "anchoring" effect 
occurs in situations wherein individuals are required to make a numerical estimate by 
starting from some initial value that is adjusted to yield a final answer. These final answers 
typically fail to depart sufficiently from the starting values (see also Slovic and Liehten- 
stein, 1971). In the 1982 panel interviews, respondents were asked first to state their current 
locations on an attitude scale and then to provide estimates of what their positions were in 
1973. If the anchoring tendency affects these estimates, respondents" perceived amounts of 
attitude change would be systematically smaller than the observed differences between 
their 1982 self-placements and those provided in 1973. 
3, Instances in which observed and recalled opinion shifts directly conflicted were hardly 
rare- see Table 5. 
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